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At present, the uniform nationwide standard of care is only an
abstraction in the most progressive medical and legal minds. In an
attempt to arrest the growing public criticism,58 the medical pro-
fession has acted to improve both its practice of medicine and its
relationship with the legal profession. To improve the practice of
medicine, the profession has established numerous continuing educa-
tion programs; it has been suggested that such programs might be
more effective if attendance and a terminal examination were man-
datory.59 To improve its relationship with the legal profession, the
medical profession, through local medical societies, has joined with
bar associations to provide expert testimony for the injured patients.60
Other mitigating activities include benefit schedules similar to work-
men's compensation schedules; interim payment by insurers to injured
patients, without admission of liability; and the use of arbitration. 61
As noted above, the medical profession has taken concrete, al-
though preliminary, steps toward a solution. The ideal, however, is
still the uniform nationwide standard of care. Such standard should
be an integral part of the "uniform national code of malpractice
evidence and standards" requested by the First National Conference
on Medical Malpractice. 62 It is hoped that the President's Commission
on Medical Malpractice, 63 the single group with power delegated to
act affrinatively and immediately, will delineate the standard so
vital to renewed excellence in medical treatment.
Regardless of the solution ultimately reached, the Kentucky court's
progressive decision in Blair v. Eblen may be viewed as a timely in-
vitation to the medical profession to resolve the malpractice problem.
Katherine Randall Bowden
FEDERAL INJUNCrIVE RELIEF: WHAT REMAINS AFTER YOUNGER V. HAR-
ms?-Historically, the equitable remedy of injunction has been subjected
to extensive limitations. Few legal maxims are as often referred to as
"equity will not grant specific relief where there exists an adequate
remedy at law." In application of this principle the courts have not
U8 See notes 45-49 supra, and accompanying text.
59 AMMIUCAN OsTEoPATHmc AssOCrATiON, supra note 48, at 30.
60 For a discussion of the use of panels of experts by California, Arizona,
Nevada, New Jersey, Indiana, and Wisconsin, see R. LONG, THE PHYSICIAN Arm
THE LAw 79 (1968).
61 AMEICrAN OSTEOPATHIC Associ moN, supra note 48 at 28.
62 Id. at 38.
63 See note 46 supra.
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been hesitant in denying injunctive relief where statutory civil, criminal
and administrative procedures have been termed "adequate" to settling
a plaintiffs grievances. There has, however, in recent years been a
notable increase in the use of injunctions in two specific situations.
The first situation arises when sensitive first amendment rights become
subjected to the "chilling effects" of vague state statutes and the
second when activities are protected from harassment of threatened or
actual prosecution in bad faith under the Civil Bights Act of 1964.1
The purpose of this comment is to examine and explore the extent
to which the recent Supreme Court decision in Younger v. Harris2
has affected these recently expanded grounds for injunctive relief.
In this case John Harris, Jr., was indicted under the California Criminal
Syndicalism Act.3 Harris then sought relief in the Federal District
Court to enjoin Eville J. Younger, the District Attorney for Los
Angeles County, from prosecuting him under this Act alleging that the
prosecution and even the presence of this Act violated his freedoms
of speech, press and association guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 22844 a three-judge Federal District Court
was convened and held that California's Criminal Syndicalism Act was
unconstitutionally vague.5 The District Court then enjoined Younger
from "further prosecution of the currently pending action against the
plaintiff Harris for alleged violation of the Act."6 District Attorney
Younger appealed the District Court's decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 12537 and presented three basic questions: (1) whether the Supreme
Court's decision, in Whitney v. California,8 holding the California
law here in question constitutional, was binding on the District Court;
(2 )whether the state's law is constitutional on its face and (3) whether
the issuance of an injunction was in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2283. 9
1 REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
2 - U.S. - , 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971).
3 CAL. PENAL CODE § 11401 which makes it a felony to advocate, teach or aid
and abet the commission of crime, sabotage or unlawful acts of force and violence
or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing any political change.
4 This section requires, by Act of Congress, a three-judge district court to hear
cases asking for an injunction to restrain enforcement of a state statute.
5 Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
6 Id. at 517 (1968).
7 This Act states:
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the
Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hear-
ing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or
proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined
by a district court of three judges.
8274 U.S. 357 (1927).
9 This Act specifically notes:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay pro-
(Continued on next page)
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The Supreme Court, in Younger v. Harris, held:
[T]he judgment of the District Court, enjoining appellant Younger
from prosecuting under these California statutes, must be reversed
as a violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts to
stay or enjoin pending state proceedings except under special
circumstances.10
HISTORY
Since the beginning of this nation's history the federal judiciary has
been prevented, subject to a few exceptions, from interfering in state
court proceedings. Yet, men have also been concerned about the
possibility and problems of state courts not fully enforcing certain
rights guaranteed to all citizens by the Federal Constitution. James
Madison, father of the Federal Constitution, was concerned with
"What was to be done after improper verdicts in state tribunals,
obtained under the biased directions of a dependent judge, or the local
prejudice of an undirected jury?""
Because of the arguments of Madison and others, the Constitution
does not prevent the federal courts from enjoining any state proceed-
ings.12 However, in 1793, Congress denied federal courts the power
to interfere in state court proceedings. The Act of March 2, 1793,
which is the predecessor of the present section 2283 provided: "[N]or
shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court
of any state."'3 This clause remained intact with only slight modi-
fication, in the area of bankruptcy, until the new Judicial Code of
1948. Despite the seemingly absolute language of the prohibition
against injunctions many exceptions were carved into it with little
resistance. 14 In 1941, the Supreme Court attempted to stop this loose
judicial interpretation of the anti-injunction law. In that year the
Court, in its decision in Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.,' 5
reversed this trend by "strictly" interpreting and applying the anti-
injunction statutes. But the implications of Toucey were soon super-
ceded by the somewhat more liberalized language of section 2283
of the Judicial Code of 1948. It has been criticized, however, that
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
ceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Con-
gress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effecuate its judgments.
0 ___ U.S. --- , 91 S. Ct. 746, 749 (1971).
115 ELIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONsTrrUION 159
(1787).
12 Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HAiv. L. BEv.
726 (1961).
13Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334 (1793).
14 See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HAv. L. REv. 996 (1965).
15 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
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"Section 2283 leaves the question of interference to the equitable
discretion of the federal courts.. ...16
In addition to section 2283, 42 U.S.C. 1983 has been very active in
employing the courts' equity powers. In essence, this statute is a
by-product of the Reconstruction Congress and was designed to protect
the newly won rights of freedom by providing a civil remedy for the
deprivation of these rights.17 But according to traditional doctrine,
equity would not enjoin criminal prosecution, protect personal rights,
nor act when a legal remedy was available and adequate.18 Thus,
even after the passage of section 1983 and nearly two hundred years
after Madison voiced his concern, we were still faced with the problems
of "dependent" state judges and the "prejudices" of local juries pre-
vailing. The all important question, however, still remained unan-
swered over the mandates of the Federal Constitution. Was there an
"adequate remedy" at law when criminal laws were enforced dis-
criminatorily or vexatiously in order to obstruct a legitimate activity?19
The Supreme Court, in Monroe v. Pape,20 answered this question
by examining the meaning of section 1983 to determine if Congress
intended "to give a remedy to parties deprived of Constitutional
rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position."2'
In Monroe the Court held that Congress did intend to provide such a
remedy because:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed
was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason
of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance, or otherwise, state laws
might not be enforced and the claim of citizens to the enjoyment
of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment might be denied by state agencies.22
Therefore, since the Act of 1793 was in force at the time section
1983 became law, if it were intended as an exception, section 1983
would still be so under the present section 2283. But unfortunately
there is no indication whether or not section 1983 was meant as an
exception to the anti-injunction act of 1793. Therefore the question
of whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283 is
'6 Boyer, Federal Injunctive Relief: A Counterpoise Against the Use of State
Criminal Prosecution Designed to Deter the Exercise of Preferred Constitutional
Rights, 13 How. L.J. 69 (1967).
17Note, The Dombrowski Remedy, Federal Injunctions Against State Court
Proceedings Violative of Constitutional Rights, 21 RuTGEns L. Rxv. 92, at 105
(1966).
1878 Hnv. L. REV., supra note 14, at 996.
19 See generally, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
20 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
21 Id. at 172.
22 Id. at 180.
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still a matter of judicial interpretation. This interpretation is likely to
turn on the points of comity and abstention.
CONSIERATION OF COMITY
The English doctrine of comity was adopted in the United States
to prevent friction between state and federal courts. It is basically
defined as "[t]he principle in accordance with which the courts of one
state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions
of another, not as a matter of obligation ..."23 Comity is "more than
a mere courtesy or goodwill but less than a positive rule of law.2 4
It is the reason behind the long-standing policy against federal courts
interfering in state court proceedings.
The first major exception that established the power of the federal
courts to intervene in state court proceedings was set forth in Ex
Parte Young.25 In Young the court stated that federal courts could
enjoin state proceedings where state officials "[t]hreaten and are
about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to
enforce against parties affected by an unconstitutional act . . .26
Strict application of this principle would have allowed federal courts
to adjudicate the constitutionality of any questionable state law. But
the Court went on to temper that principle by saying that this may not
be done except under extraordinary circumstances where the danger
of irreparable loss is both great and immediate.
27
CONSIDERATION OF ABSTENTION
The Supreme Court has sought to avoid conflicts with state courts
through the doctrine of judicial restraint. In the case of Railroad Com-
mission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,28 the Supreme Court held in estab-
lishing the abstention doctrine, that a federal court should sometimes
abstain from deciding a case until after the state court has ruled on
the matter. Abstention has been defined as the doctrine "whereby
a federal court motivated by principles of comity or by a desire to
avoid premature constitutional adjudication, declines to proceed in a
case over which it has jurisdiction and remits all or part of the con-
troversy to a state court. "29 This doctrine assumes that state courts
and prosecutors will observe constitutional limitations in their pro-
23 BLACK's LAW DIcTiONARY, 334 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
24 13 How. L.J., supra note 16 at 73.
25 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
26 Id. at 156.
27 Id.
28 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
29 13 How. L.J., supra note 16, at 76-77.
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ceedings. Therefore the mere possibility of erroneous initial application
of constitutional standards will not usually constitute "irreparable
injury" necessary to justify a federal court injunction. This rule was
explicitly set forth in Douglas v. City of Jeanette.a0 The Supreme
Court, in refusing to grant injunctive relief, stated that the enjoining
of a state's criminal process, by a federal court is to be justified only
on a showing of both great and immediate irreparable injury.31
Thus, strict application of the Douglas principle would have pre-
vented federal courts from intervening in state criminal prosecutions
or enjoining enforcement of unconstitutional state laws. However, to
assure protection of preferred constitutional rights the Supreme Court
in Dombrowski v. Pfister32 held that abstention is inappropriate in
First Amendment cases. 33
DmLomN-r OF THE INJuNcON-DOMBROWSKI TO HARms
In Dombrowski, the executive director of the Southern Conference
Educational Fund (SCEF), James Dombrowskd was arrested under
two Louisiana "anti-subversion" statutes. One was the "Subversive
Activities and Communist Control Law"34 and the other was the
"Communist Propaganda Control Law" 35 These were criminal statutes
whose possible punishment included a fine of $'10,000 and 10 years
imprisonment. 3 Among the dangerous articles found upon search
of Dombrowski's house and office were Thoreau's Journal and
SCEF membership and contribution lists. These articles and other files
and records were removed from the SCEF's office, destroying its
capacity to function. Soon after, the warrants were summarily vacated
on the ground that there were no facts whatsoever to justify binding
the defendants over for trial. Despite this, Representative Pfister,
Chairman of the Louisiana Joint Legislative Committee on Un-
American Activities demanded enforcement of the "anti-subversion"
30 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
31 Id. at 163-64.
32380 U.S. 479 (1965).
33 Mr. justice Brennan, speaking for the court, stated:
[T]he abstention doctrine is inappropriate for cases such as the present
one where, unlike Douglas v. City of Jeannette, statutes are justifiably
attacked on their face as abridging free expression, or as applied for the
purpose of discouraging protected activities.3 4 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:358-374 (Supp. 1971).
3 5 
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. H§ 14:390-390.8 (Supp. 1971).
36 Teestatutes made it a felony for anyone belogn to a cmuis1rn
organization" to remain in Louisiana longer than five days without registering as
such. The statutes created a presumption that an organization was "communist
front" if it "had in any ... way been officially cited or identified" as such by (1)
Attorney General of the United States, (2) Subversive Activities Control Board
of the United States, or (3) by committee or subcommittee of the United States
Congress.
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laws against Dombrowski. At this point Dombrowski flied a complaint
in the federal district court. He sought permanent and interlocutory
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that the prosecution
commenced and threatened against them was not undertaken in good
faith, but was malicious and without probable cause 7
In December of 1963, a three-judge district court was convened and
a majority orally ruled that (1) the statutes were constitutional on
their face and that (2) assuming the facts alleged to be true, the
complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted.38
On appeal the Supreme Court held that the defendant's complaint
was valid and that he should not be barred from obtaining equitable
relief in federal courts. In explaining its reasons for overturning the
District Court, the Supreme Court stated that the threatened and
actual prosecution, under the Louisiana statutes, was not made with
any expectation of securing valid convictions. Rather, this was part
of a plan to use threats of prosecution, arrests, searches, and seizures
to harass and discourage appellant and his supporters from asserting
or attempting to vindicate the constitutional rights of Negro citizens
of Louisiana.89 This prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its
success or failure, was termed by the Court to be "[t]he chilling effect
upon the exercise of First Amendment rights . ..4
In summary, the Dombrowski case said that a district court should
not abstain, but should grant injunctive relief when statutes are uncon-
stitutional on their face or where they are applied to harass and dis-
courage the exercise of free expression or other First Amendment
rights.41 In addition, Dombrowski also limited the use of abstention
by expanding the meaning of "irreparable injury."
42
After Dombrowski it became clear that the court was not about
to let "bad faith enforcement" prevail by itself. The Supreme Court,
in Cameron v. Johnson8 limited the "bad faith" part of Dombrowski
to cases of clear harassment and bad faith. In Cameron a district
court injunction was sought against enforcement of Mississippi's anti-
picketing statute.44 It was alleged that the statute was both uncon-
stitutionally vague and unconstitutionally applied. A divided court
denied the injunction after finding that the record did not establish
37 See Civ. A. No. 14019, Dombrowski v. Pfister, E.D. La. 1963.
38 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F.Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964).
39 380 U.S. at 482.
40 380 U.S. at 487.
41 Comment, The Louisiana Compromise, Abstention and Vagueness: Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 153 (1965).4 2 Note, Constitutional Law: Limitations Imposed on Traditional Use of
Doctrine of Federal Judicial Abstention, 1966 Dux L.J. 219 (1966).
43390 U.S. 611 (1968).44 MIss. CODE ANN. § 2318.5 (Supp. 1970).
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the necessary bad faith and harassment. 45 In Cameron the court
adopted a "distinction that the lower federal courts had been following
in practice, the distinction between obvious harassment and a claim
of bad faith enforcement.4
It is against this background that the propriety of an injunction in
the Harris case must be judged. This main issue the court considered
in Harris, and the point the case seems to turn on, is the "long-
standing public policy against federal court interference with state
court proceedings.. ."47 The reasons behind this policy are two-fold.
First, in doctrine of equity jurisprudence:
[T]hat courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not
act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has
an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury
if denied equitable relief.
48
This reason is supported by the second consideration, the doctrine
of "comity." The Court went on to discuss "Our Federalism" and how
"the National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate way."49 The Court pointed out that when absolutely neces-
sary, for the protection of constitutional rights, federal courts have the
power to enjoin state officers from initiating criminal proceedings.
However, this may not be done "except under extraordinary circum-
stances" where the danger of irreparable injury is both great and
immediate.50 Irreparable injury became a key turning point in Harris.
Throughout the case the court stressed the importance of showing
this factor. However, the Court made it clear that "even irreparable
injury is insufficient unless it is both great and immediate."51
Irreparable damage, the Court concluded, does include the cost,
anxiety, and inconvenience of a single criminal prosecution. Though
45 Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968). Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking
for the Court stated:
[W]e viewed Dombrowski to be a case presenting a situation of the
"impropriety of [state officials] invoking the statute in bad faith to *mpose
continuing harassment in order to discourage appellants' activities....
In contrast... in this case... there was no harassment, intimidation, or
oppression .... Id. at 619.
46 Sedler, The Dombrowski-Type Suit as an Effective Weapon for Social
Change: Reflections From Without and Within, 18 KAN. L. REv. 237, 269




51 Id. at 751.
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these factors may have a "chilling effect" they, by themselves, do not
justify federal intervention. 52
In addition the Supreme Court in Harris concluded that the
procedures for testing a statute's validity "on its face," in Dombrowski
are "fundamentally at odds with the function of the federal court in
our constitutional plan."53 The Court based this conclusion on the
well established principle that the source and duty of the judiciary to
declare laws unconstitutional is in the final analysis, derived from its
responsibility for resolving concrete disputes brought before the courts
for decision.54 In other words, it is rarely an appropriate task for the
courts to render "advisory opinions" on the constitutionality of statutes
"on their face."
Finally, the Court held that "[tlhe Dombrowski decision should
not be regarded as having upset the settled doctrines that have already
confined very narrowly the availability of injunctive relief against state
criminal prosecutions."55
At this point it might be helpful to compare the holdings in the
Dombrowski and the Harris cases. There are two basic distinguishing
facts. First, in Dombrowski there was no state prosecution pending
before federal proceeding started, whereas in Harris there was. Second,
James Dombrowski alleged and proved "bad faith" and "harassment"
whereas John Harris did not even allege that the prosecution was
brought in bad faith to harass him.
CONCLUSION
The general principle, basic to American Federalism, that the
United States courts should refrain from interfering with state
courts' enforcing local laws is unassailable. But the sharp edge of
the Supremacy Clause cuts across all such generalizations. When a
state, under the pretext of preserving law and order uses local laws,
valid on their face, to harass and punish citizens for exercise of
their constitutional rights or federally protected statutory rights,
the general principle must yield to the exception .... 56
52Mr. justice Black, speaking for the court, stated:
Moreover, the existence of a "chilling effect," even in the area of First
Amendment rights, has never been considered a sufficient basis, in and
of itself, for prohibiting state action. Id. at 754.
53 Id.
54 See, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803).
55 Younger v. Harris, - U.S. - , 90 S. Ct. 746, 755 (1971). In con-
cluding his opinion, Mr. Justice Black stated:
Because our holding rests on the absence of the factors under equitable
principles to justify federal intervention, we have no occasion to consider
whether 28 U.S.C. § 2283 ... would in and of itself be controlling under
the circumstances of this case.56 Cox v. Louisiana, 348 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1965).
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In essence, injunctive relief should be given when a plaintiffs
constitutional rights are threatened by "bad faith" criminal prosecution.
If an injunction were not granted, the only remedy left would be to
subject the plaintiff to the uncertainties and dangers of multiple
criminal prosecution. It is these imponderables and contingencies that
inhibit the full exercise of first amendment rights. In such a case the
remedy at law would be at war with itself. Therefore, the rule
established in Harris seems to be in conflict with the public policy of
assuring that legitimate conduct is not inhibited by unnecessary legal
uncertainty.5
7
The final result of the Harris decision is that an individual's con-
stitutional rights vary depending upon whether or not he is able to
file his papers in the federal court before the prosecution can present
its case to a grand jury. This "race to the court house" was predicted
by Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in Dombrowski in
which he said: "to make standing and criminality turn on which
party wins the race to the forum of its own choice is to repudiate the
considerations of federalism to which the Court pays lip service."58
Despite the ambiguities and the questions left unanswered in
Younger v. Harris, the decision appears to signal a retreat in the
judicial attitude toward substantive due process by restricting the
availability of injunctive relief.
Stephen Driesler
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TBE INDIGENT DEFENDANT MOVES ONE STEP
CLOSER TO EQUALITY.
We should say now, and in no uncertain terms, that a man's mere
property status, without more, cannot be used by a state to test,
qualify, or limit his rights as a citizen of the United States. 'Indi-
gence' in itself is neither a source of rights nor a basis for denying
them. The mere state of being without funds is a neutral fact-
constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed, or color....
Any measure which would divide our citizenry on the basis of
property into one class free to move from state to state and another
class that is poverty bound to the place where it has suffered
misfortune is not only at war with the habit and custom by which
our country has expanded, but is also a short-sighted blow at the
security of property itself. Property can have no more dangerous,
even if unwitting, enemy than one who would make its possession
5 7 See Bunis v. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d 207, 234 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1962),
appeal dismissed, 12 N.Y.2d 882, 188 N.E.2d 260 (1963).
5s 380 U.S. at 502 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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